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Romagoza v. García: Proving Command Responsibility under the Alien Tort
Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act
by Beth Van Schaack*

O

n July 23, 2002, in the courtroom of Judge Daniel T.K.
Hurley, a South Florida jury returned a $54.6 million
verdict, encompassing punitive and compensatory
damages, in favor of three Salvadoran survivors of torture. The
case, Romagoza v. García, was brought by three Salvadoran
refugees — Dr. Juan Romagoza, Professor Carlos Mauricio,
and Neris González—against two former ministers of defense
of El Salvador. The plaintiffs were represented by the nonprofit Center for Justice & Accountability, a San Franciscobased human rights law firm, with pro bono assistance from Bay
Area attorneys of Morrison & Foerster LLP, James K. Green
of West Palm Beach, and Professor Carolyn Patty Blum and
the University of California Boalt Hall School of Law International Human Rights Clinic. The defendants were represented by Kurt Klaus, Jr., a criminal defense and family law
solo practitioner based in Florida.
The verdict heralds a major victory in the worldwide fight
against impunity for human rights violations. Most significantly, the case is one of the first modern cases in which defendant commanders, fully contesting the allegations and testifying in their own defense, have been held liable for human
rights violations exclusively under the doctrine of command
responsibility. The case, therefore, served to further cement
the doctrine into United States law. The other recent case in
which the plaintiffs relied solely on the doctrine of command responsibility, Ford v. García, was brought in the same
courtroom against the same two generals by families of the
four United States churchwomen who were raped and murdered by members of the Salvadoran National Guard in
1980. The two cases were filed concurrently in May 1999
and proceeded in parallel until 2000, when the churchwomen’s case went to trial. In November 2000, a jury rendered
a verdict in the Ford case that the generals could not be held
liable for the crimes, apparently because the jury was not satisfied that the two generals had “effective control” over their
subordinates. The Romagoza case thus provides an important
precedent for other human rights cases brought against military commanders for the human rights violations of their subordinates and has also in part rectified what many observers
felt was an unfair and flawed result in the Ford case due to
problems with the jury instructions.
The Statutory Basis for the Suit: The Alien Tort Claims Act and
the Torture Victim Protection Act
The case was brought under two United States statutes that
allow victims of human rights violations to sue perpetrators
and other responsible parties in United States courts. The
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), was enacted in 1789 as part
of the First Judiciary Act, which provided that “the district
court shall have . . . cognizance, concurrent with the courts
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be,
of all causes where an alien sues for tort only in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The language allowing aliens to sue for torts committed in violation
of the laws of nations was later codified as the ATCA, 28 U.S.C.
§1350. The plaintiff(s) must be an alien and the defendant(s) may be a U.S. or a foreign citizen or corporation. By
most accounts, the ATCA was enacted to respond to certain
incidents involving foreign actors that made clear that under
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their original grants of jurisdiction, the federal courts were
impotent in the face of violations of the law of nations involving non-nationals. The ATCA remedied this jurisdictional gap
by allowing the federal courts to adjudicate tort claims under
the law of nations, i.e., international law.
The ATCA was little used until 1978, when the family of
a Paraguayan youth who had been kidnapped and murdered
learned that the policeman who tortured the young man to
death was living in the United States. The family enlisted the
help of the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York,
which brought suit in the United States District Court of
the Eastern District of New York under the ancient statute.
The district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds,
ruling that it felt it was bound by precedent to construe the
“law of nations” narrowly so as not to reach the treatment by
state agents of citizens of that state. The Second Circuit in
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, however, reinstated the case by announcing: “Construing this rarely-invoked provision, we hold that
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties.” The
Filártigas were eventually awarded over $10 million in damages, and the defendant was deported.
The modern-day cause of action under the ATCA was
bolstered by a more recent and complementary statute, the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which is codified as
a note to the ATCA. The passage of the TVPA was mandated
continued on next page
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by the United States’ signature and eventual ratification of
the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture
Convention), which obliges states party to enact implementing legislation allowing victims of torture to “prosecute or extradite” suspected torturers and provide victims with
a right to reparation. Accordingly, the United States Congress
passed the TVPA in 1991, and President George H.W. Bush
signed the law in 1992 in order to implement the Torture
Convention’s obligations with respect to civil redress.
The TVPA provides that
(1)

(2)

An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or under color of law, of any foreign nation—
subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall,
in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person who
may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.

Thus, the TVPA creates a federal cause of action specifically for torture and summary execution committed anywhere in the world. Both the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) may be U.S. or foreign citizens, as long as the
defendant acted under color of law of a foreign nation. The
legislative history makes clear that in passing the TVPA,
Congress intended to codify the Filártiga result and extend
the right of access to federal courts to U.S. citizens with
international law claims. This history also stresses the importance of protecting human rights around the world and of
granting victims of torture and extrajudicial killing access to
U.S. courts.
Pursuant to the Torture Convention, Congress also
amended the federal criminal code at 18 U.S.C. §23409(a)
to provide that: “Whoever outside the United States commits
or attempts to commit torture shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if death
results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any
term of years or for life.” In contrast to other nations, the
United States has yet to initiate any prosecutions for torture
despite the legal ability, and indeed obligation, to do so. As
a result of this inaction, victims of human rights violations
seeking justice in the United States are limited to civil
redress.
Since Filártiga, there have been dozens of civil suits
brought under the ATCA and the TVPA in the United States
arising out of human rights abuses around the world, including claims of genocide, torture, summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The ATCA is also increasingly being invoked
against corporate defendants for complicity in human rights
violations including forced labor, extrajudicial killing, and
environmental harm. So far, the majority of the cases against
individual defendants has resulted in default judgments,
because personal jurisdiction over the defendant was based
on transient jurisdiction, or the defendant simply fled the
jurisdiction once suit was filed or after filing unsuccessful
motions to dismiss. As a result, enforcing the multi-million
dollar judgments obtained in these cases has proven difficult.
Thus, the case against the Salvadoran generals marked one
of the first instances in which a defendant in a human rights
case, under either the ATCA or the TVPA, presented a vig-

Plantiffs Carlos Mauricio and Neris González celebrate after the
jury delivered the verdict.

orous defense by testifying in his own defense, and in which
at least one of the defendants is believed to have substantial
assets.
The Parties to the Action
The case was brought by three plaintiffs, all refugees
from El Salvador, against two former ministers of defense of
El Salvador for abuses during the period of 1979-1983. That
period was marked by widespread atrocities committed by
members of the Salvadoran military and security forces
against civilians, including clerics and churchworkers, health
workers, teachers, members of peasant and labor unions, the
poor, and anyone alleged to have leftist sympathies. A Truth
Commission established by the United Nations pursuant to
the Salvadoran Peace Accords concluded that tens of thousands of civilians were detained, tortured, murdered, or disappeared during the worst 12 years of the civil war, which
ended in 1992. The Truth Commission maintained that
85% of the abuses were attributable to members of the military and security forces, as opposed to unaffiliated death
squads or the rebel forces. The plaintiffs in this action were
three of the civil war’s victims who were fortunate to survive,
where others perished.
Dr. Juan Romagoza
The lead plaintiff, Dr. Juan Romagoza, was working in an
impromptu health clinic in a church when a detachment of
the army and security forces arrived in military vehicles.
Because Dr. Romazoga had medical equipment and what
appeared to be military boots, he was captured and taken to
a local army base. Dr. Romagoza was then transferred by helicopter to the National Guard headquarters in San Salvador
where he was brutally tortured for three weeks. As part of his
torture, he was hung by his fingertips with wire and shot
through his left arm to signify that he was a “leftist,” which
destroyed his hands and has made it impossible for him to
continue to practice surgery. He was also beaten, raped,
starved, electro-shocked, and kept in hideous conditions.
At one point during his detention, Dr. Romagoza was visited by an individual whom his torturers called “mi coronel,”
or “the big boss,” and to whom they acted deferentially. Dr.
Romagoza could see under his blindfold that the individual
was wearing a formal uniform and well-polished boots. This
new arrival interrogated Dr. Romagoza about two of his
uncles who were in the military, asking him if they were
passing weapons to the guerillas. When Dr. Romagoza was
continued on next page
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eventually released into his uncle’s custody, he saw General
Vides Casanova, one of the defendants in the case, talking
to his other uncle and recognized the defendant’s voice as
belonging to the person who had been in the torture room
with him.
After his release, brokered by his uncles in the military,
Dr. Romagoza escaped from El Salvador and eventually
made his way across the Mexican border into the United
States. He later received political asylum and now runs a free
health clinic for the Latino population of Washington, D.C.

he had received in utero, but Ms. González’s only memories
of this are what her mother and daughter have told her.
Ms. González eventually moved to the United States at the
suggestion of a therapist in El Salvador who told her that her
flashbacks, anxiety attacks, and the gaps in her memory
were due to the torture she suffered and that he was illequipped to treat her. Ms. González’s therapist told her
about the Marjorie Kovler Center in Chicago, which specializes in working with victims of torture. Ms. González
eventually moved to Chicago to get the help she needed and
obtained political asylum. She now is the executive director
of an environmental education program there.

Credit: The Center for Justice & Accountability

The Defendants
The defendants in this action were two former ministers
Professor Carlos Mauricio
of defense of El Salvador. One defendant, General José
Professor Carlos Mauricio was teaching agronomy at the
Guillermo García, was minister of defense from 1979–1983.
University of El Salvador when he was lured out of his classAt that time, the other defendant, General Carlos Eugenio
room and taken to the National Police headquarters in San
Vides Casanova, was the director-general of the National
Salvador. Professor Mauricio was detained in a secret cell and
Guard, one of three internal security forces under the juristortured for approximately nine days, which included being
diction of the ministry of defense
beaten repeatedly with fists, feet,
along with the army and other miliand metal bars; being hung for
tary forces. When General García
hours with his arms behind his
retired in 1983, General Vides
back; and being forced to witCasanova was appointed minister of
ness the torture of others. As a
defense. The defendants both arrived
result of these beatings, two of
in the United States in 1989, and
his ribs were broken, and his
General García later obtained politvision was permanently damaged
ical asylum based on allegations that
in one eye.
he was being threatened by “leftist
Following this phase of his
forces” within El Salvador. Both
detention, Professor Mauricio
defendants lived comfortably in
was inexplicably transferred to a
south Florida until they were discovpublic cell where he remained
ered in 1999 by the Lawyers Comfor about nine days. It was at this
mittee for Human Rights, which had
time that Professor Mauricio realbeen representing the families of the
ized he would be released. Pro- Trial counsel Peter Stern, Beth Van Schaack, and
four churchwomen in their quest for
fessor Mauricio was finally James Green.
justice.
released due to the intervention
of his then father-in-law, who was
The Legal Theory: The Doctrine of Command Responsibility
in the military. Professor Mauricio believes he was targeted
Both Salvadoran cases were brought under the internafor capture because he had traveled out of the country for
tional
legal doctrine of command responsibility. This doctrine
schooling and worked with campesinos (peasants) to help
has
existed
as long as there have been military institutions,
them increase their yields.
but it was utilized most prominently during the Nuremberg
Professor Mauricio fled from El Salvador soon after his
and Tokyo proceedings following World War II to convict top
release and made his way to San Francisco where he got a job
Nazi and Japanese defendants. Since then, the doctrine has
washing dishes. He eventually learned English, was granted
been employed in several ATCA and TVPA cases (including
legal permanent resident status, and was awarded a Masters
the cases against ex-President Ferdinand Marcos of the
degree and his teaching credentials. He now teaches science
Philippines; the self-proclaimed president of Republika Srpat a Bay Area school that serves disadvantaged youth.
ska, Radovan Karad žić; and Héctor Gramajo, a former Minister of Defense of Guatemala) and also serves as the basis
Neris González
for prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunals
Neris González was a catechist who taught literacy and simfor Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). Long a docple mathematics to campesinos in the province of San Vicente.
trine of customary international law, command responsiShe was captured one day in the market by members of the
bility has in modern times been codified at Articles 86 and
National Guard and taken to a local garrison. There, she was
87 in Protocol I to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, Artitortured for three weeks, raped repeatedly, and was forced
cles 7(3) and 6(3) of the statutes of the two war crimes trito watch others be tortured, mutilated, and killed. At the time,
bunals, and Article 28 of the statute of the International Crimshe was eight months pregnant. The guardsmen wounded
inal Court. The United States military has long endorsed the
her belly repeatedly, at one point balancing a bed frame on
doctrine that commanders are responsible for the actions of
her and riding the frame like a seesaw.
their subordinates, as is expressed in the Department of
Because of the trauma she suffered, Ms. González has no
the Army’s Field Manual, for example.
firm memory of how she escaped captivity. She has been able
According to this longstanding doctrine, a military comto piece together that she was taken in the back of a truck full
mander
can be held legally responsible—either criminally or
of dead bodies to a local dump. At some point, her baby was
born, and local villagers heard the sound of her baby crying
continued on next page
and rescued her. Her baby died two months later of injuries
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civilly—for unlawful acts committed by his subordinates. A
commander is found liable if he or she knew—or should have
known given the circumstances—that his or her subordinates
were committing abuses, and he or she did not take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent these abuses
or punish the perpetrators. The doctrine involves, in essence,
three main elements:
1. The direct perpetrators of the unlawful acts were subordinates of the defendant commander;
2. The defendant commander knew (actual knowledge)
or should have known (constructive knowledge) that
his troops were committing, had committed, or were
about to commit abuses; and
3. The defendant commander failed to take steps to prevent or punish criminal conduct by subordinates.
Thus, the plaintiffs (with the exception of Dr. Romagoza
who identified General Vides Casanova in the torture chamber and then again upon his release from detention) did not
argue that the generals personally participated in—or even
knew about—their detention and torture. Rather, they
argued that because the defendants were on notice that
their troops were committing abuses, but nonetheless failed
to supervise them properly or punish perpetrators, the commanders should be held liable for the abuses the plaintiffs
suffered.
In the early stages of both cases against the generals, it was
clear that a key challenge would be to establish the legal standard governing when an individual could be considered
the legal subordinate of a defendant commander within
the understanding of the first prong of the doctrine. With
respect to this burden, the ICTY and ICTR have required the
prosecution to demonstrate that the defendant commander
exercised “effective control” over the individual perpetrators.
This approach is most clearly set out in the ICTY judgment
in The Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. According to this approach,
a showing of de jure command over an individual within a
military hierarchy is a relevant, but not sufficient, showing
to satisfy the first prong of the doctrine. Rather, satisfaction
of the first prong of the doctrine requires a showing that a
commander exercised de facto control over subordinates.
This burden requires the presentation of evidence that,
among other things, the commander was actually able to issue
orders to his subordinates and to ensure that those orders
were carried out. Although this approach was developed in
the context of the Yugoslav conflict, in which individuals operating without a grant of de jure command from any formal
state were exercising de facto control over individuals committing abuses, the tribunals have applied the effective control requirement to prosecutions against de jure commanders
as well, for example, in The Prosecutor v. Blaskić.
Given the strength of this international precedent, Judge
Hurley ruled in the Ford case that prong one of the doctrine
of command responsibility would be satisfied with proof
that the defendants exercised effective control over the individuals committing the abuses. After long deliberations with
the parties, this standard was eventually concretized in
instructions on the law for the jury. The Ford plaintiffs
appealed this ruling and the resulting jury instructions, urging that it was uncontested that the generals exercised de jure
command over their subordinates in the National Guard and
that the Ford instructions improperly placed the burden on
v

Trial counsel Joshua Sondheimer and Carlos Mauricio.

the plaintiffs to prove effective command as well, which they
argued was an affirmative defense of the defendants. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld the district court’s jury instructions, requiring the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant commander—either de jure or de facto—
exercised effective control over his troops. The plaintiffs in
Ford have petitioned for certiorari.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion, in effect, gave the Romagoza
plaintiffs their marching orders in terms of the command
responsibility jury instructions. Accordingly, the instructions
in the Romagoza case set forth the elements of the doctrine as
follows:
1) The plaintiff was tortured by a member of the military, the security forces, or by someone acting in
concert with the military or security forces;
2) No independent superior-subordinate relationship
existed between the defendant/military commander
and the person(s) who tortured the plaintiff;
3) The defendant/military commander knew, or
should have known, owing to the circumstances of
the time, that his subordinates had committed,
were committing, or were about to commit torture
and/or extrajudicial killing; and
4) The defendant/military commander failed to take
all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent torture and/or extrajudicial killing, or failed to punish subordinates after they had committed torture
and/or extrajudicial killing.
The instructions then explained that “effective control”
means that
the defendant/military commander had the actual ability to prevent the torture or to punish the persons
accused of committing the torture. In other words, to
establish effective control, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant/military commander had the actual ability to control the person(s) accused of torturing the plaintiff.
Thus, in contrast to the Ford case, the term and definition of
“effective control” was not contained in the formulation of
the doctrinal elements themselves. Rather, it appeared in a
subsidiary explanatory paragraph, which likely served to deemphasize the concept for the jury. The instructions also clarified that it was not necessary to prove that the defendant
commander knew that the plaintiffs themselves would be targeted for abuse; rather, it was sufficient that the defendants
continued on page 31
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knew that subordinates were committing human rights
abuses like those suffered by the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in Romagoza drew from the Delalić case, in
which the ICTY ruled that a showing of de jure command gives
rise to a legal presumption that the defendant commander
exercised effective control. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued
that the jury should be instructed on the existence and
operation of this presumption. Judge Hurley nonetheless
made an initial determination that the defendants had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption and
thus declined to instruct the jury on the presumption.
The Defense and the Plaintiffs’ Rebuttal
Given the centrality of the concept of “effective control”
to the application of the doctrine of command responsibility, the defendants not surprisingly argued in both cases
that the civil war in their country had created a state of
chaos that rendered it impossible for them to know what their
subordinates were doing, or to be able to intervene to prevent abuses or punish perpetrators. This defense proved
successful in the Ford case, as statements by jurors to the press
indicate that they determined that the plaintiffs had not
met their burden of proving that the generals had “effective
control” over the subordinates who committed the churchwomen’s murders.
The defense verdict in Ford presented a cautionary forerunner to the Romagoza plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Romagoza
plaintiffs presented an array of expert testimony and documents identifying widespread patterns of torture by members
of the Salvadoran military and security forces during the
period in question. This evidence included reports of torture
published in the press and presented to the generals at the
time by non-governmental organizations and U.S. officials,
among others. The plaintiffs also demonstrated through
expert and percipient testimony that the civilian abuses
being committed by the subordinates of the generals were
systematic rather than random. In this regard, the plaintiffs
demonstrated that particular demographic segments were
specifically targeted, especially doctors, teachers, and church
workers who were working with the poor. The plaintiffs
themselves were able to testify that even if they were detained
by plainclothed persons, each of them was eventually taken
to an official government detention center where he or she
was tortured by individuals in uniform.
The plaintiffs also demonstrated that the top military
echelons were able to control their troops when they wanted
to implement the banking reform or fight the civil war. In
this regard, Terry Karl, professor of Latin American studies
at Stanford University, gave expert testimony describing the
violence in El Salvador during the relevant period as a spigot,
which could be turned on and off by the military as needed.
A retired Argentine colonel — Colonel José Luis García,
whose extensive knowledge of El Salvador stemmed from
expert testimony he provided in the trial of the murderers
of the six Jesuits who were killed in El Salvador in 1989—discussed the structure and operation of a military chain of
command in general and of Latin American militaries in particular. He also presented expert testimony that the Salvadoran military’s communications and transportation infrastructure were sufficiently developed to enable the defendants
to exercise control over their troops. Finally, the plaintiffs presented significant evidence of the generals’ failure to
denounce abuses, let alone investigate or prosecute perpe-

trators, despite their ability to do so. The plaintiffs’ military
expert provided examples of what the defendants could
have done to curb abuses by their subordinates had they had
the will to do so.
The verdict demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ evidence persuaded the jury, which found incredible the defendants’
denials that their subordinates were committing abuses or
claims that in the chaos of the civil war there was nothing
more they could have done. The jury foreperson told journalists afterward that “The generals were in charge of the
National Guard and the country. . . . It was a military dictatorship. They had the ability to do whatever they chose to do
or not do.”
The defendants have indicated their intention to appeal.
In the meantime, Kurt Klaus, the defense counsel, has
recently indicated that he will defend Juan López Grijalba,
a former Honduran military chief accused of the murder and
torture of Honduran civilians in the 1980s. This case is also
being brought by The Center for Justice & Accountability,
which filed and served the complaint on July 15, 2002.
Case Impact
The verdict against Generals García and Vides has energized human rights activists in El Salvador and has provided hope
to the Salvadoran refugee community and others. The verdict
was headline news in El Salvador, and was widely reported in the
United States. Over 150 lawyers, students, and others encouraged by the verdict attended a recent conference about the case
at the Human Rights Institute of the University of Central
America in San Salvador. Activists gave their overwhelming
support to efforts in the United States to fight against the
impunity of military and death squad leaders for abuses during
that country’s civil war. While many expressed a desire for such
cases to be brought in El Salvador, commentators noted that this
is currently impossible due to the existence of the the amnesty
law, which forgave military leaders of crimes and human rights
abuses they or their subordinates committed. At the same time,
some human rights lawyers stated that the case provided new
impetus to seek to limit or rescind the broad amnesty law
adopted by the Salvadoran Congress in 1993 in the wake of publication of the United Nation’s Truth Commission Report.
At the same time, editorials in some Salvadoran papers criticized the case as “reopening old wounds” and as a threat to
stability achieved following the Peace Accords in El Salvador. Many commentators nonetheless dismissed these
arguments as disproved by the measured debate accompanying the verdicts, and pointed to the importance of the public dialogue about the issues of justice and accountability
brought about by the case. In the United States, throngs of
supporters have greeted the plaintiffs at events in their communities to celebrate the victory, and the plaintiffs have
received messages from well-wishers around the world praising their courage and thanking them for providing hope that
some measure of justice could be achieved. 
*Printed with the permission of Guild Practitioner.
*Beth Van Schaack, as a consulting attorney with The Center
for Justice & Accountability and a former associate with Morrison
& Foerster LLP, was a member of the trial team for Romagoza v.
García. Ms. Van Schaack teaches international law at Santa
Clara University School of Law.
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